BOLIVIA: A rejection of neoliberalism
“After 500 years of domination and colonialism, more than 50 years since the introduction of universal suffrage and five years of intense social struggle, the indigenous majority of Bolivia have, for the first time, elected one of their own as president”
— Evo Morales,
President of Bolivia
Morales won 53.7% of the vote, making him the first president in decades to gain over 50% and not have to be ratified by a majority in parliament. This was a clear indication of the rejection of 20 years of neoliberal rule and the search for an alternative by the majority of South America’s poorest country.
The size of the vote, which surprised even Morales’ own party, is all the more remarkable given the intensity of the unanimous opposition of the mainstream press to Morales’ candidacy, and the evidence of fraud in some districts. In addition, more than 800,000 voters discovered on election day that they had been removed from the electoral roll, the majority within areas where MAS has strong support.
MAS won 72 of the 130 deputies, 12 of 27 senators and three of the nine prefects (department governors), which were elected for the first time. However the significance of this victory cannot only be measured in votes. More importantly, it represents a new stage in the cycle of revolutionary struggle in Bolivia, which opened in 2000 with the “water war” in Cochabamba against privatisation, along with the Aymara rebellion in the altiplano and the cocalero (coca growers) resistance in the Chapare region that same year. Since those battles, two presidents have been forced to resign — in October 2003 and in June last year — as continuous waves of protest have demanded greater control by the Bolivian people over their natural resources, particularly gas, and the decolonialisation of the racist Bolivian state.
There have been two fundamental issues at the core of the new wave of struggle. The first is the destiny of Bolivia’s gas reserves, the second largest in South America. Calls to nationalise the gas have grown among the poor majority, as a way out of poverty for the country. The second call has been for an end to the racist colonialist state and for the country to be refounded through a new constituent assembly. This assembly would rewrite the constitution and for the first time actively incorporate the indigenous majority into the country. Both of the issues were central planks of MAS’s election campaign.
As long-time Peruvian activist Hugo Blanco pointed out in an article published on January 4 at Rebelion.org, “the new president is not the result of a simple ‘democratic election’ like the many that frequently occur in our countries, it is an important step in the path of the organized Bolivian people in their struggle to take power into their own hands”.
axisoflogic.com
Africa’s Twin Curses
2005 was dubbed the “year of Africa” by the G8 and it brought some welcome progress in conflict resolution on a continent which has had more than its share of political instability: a peace deal in Sudan was finalized, U.N. peacekeepers left Sierra Leone, elections were held in Liberia and Burundi, even the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo appeared to be moving forward.
But Africa’s troubles are not over. There are continuing armed conflicts in Sudan (Darfur), Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Nigeria, Somalia and increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Sudan and Chad. Those countries where peace has been achieved remain vulnerable to future conflict. Throughout the continent effective formulae for the emergence of representative states capable of delivering successful economic development, justice and security remain elusive.
On top of Africa’s internal problems there are also two non-African issues which are hampering efforts to resolve conflicts and to promote better government and economic development.
The first is the industrialized world’s increasing thirst and competition for African oil, which seems to take precedence over pious statements about African development.
Oil has long been a curse for most people in oil producing countries in Africa. Countries like Nigeria (where almost a fifth of all Africans south of the Sahara live, Angola and Equatorial Guinea would probably be better off—less corrupt, violent, unstable and poverty-stricken—had they left the black stuff in the ground.
Since their public relations disasters in Africa in the 1990s (the execution of the Nigerian rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa in the Niger Delta; the Angolan oil-for-arms scandal), the oil majors have spent millions of dollars trying to brush up their “corporate governance” credentials. But in reality little has changed, as the latest spike in violence in Niger Delta and the continuing flagrant and debilitating corruption at the heart of Nigerian and Angolan politics demonstrate.
Now the oil curse is spreading to other African states and it is increasingly accompanied by competition for political and economic influence between China and the West.